The Central Soviet Area, as the location of the party, government, and military leaders of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the central area of the Chinese Soviet movement, effectively led various Soviet areas throughout the country, and radio played an important role in communication and communication. The wireless industry in the Central Soviet Area has developed rapidly and has continuously provided guidance and assistance to other Soviet areas in terms of talent, equipment, and practical experience, gradually building a wireless network covering major Soviet areas. The establishment of radio communication between the Central Soviet Area and other Soviet areas began on January 6, 1931, when the Red Army used the first radio station. The role of radio in the revolutionary cause was initially demonstrated and immediately drew attention. On January 28, 1931, the First Red Army ordered the vigorous development of the radio industry, especially by cultivating its own radio talents, to "make communication between our central government and other special zones, as well as between the First and Third Corps and other Red Army corps more convenient" (Central Revolutionary Base Historical Data Library - Military System (Volume 9), Central Literature Publishing House and Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2015 edition, page 648). I hope to use wireless radio as a medium to closely strengthen the connection between the Central Soviet Area and other Soviet areas, as well as between the Red First Army and other main forces of the Red Army. The successive victories in the anti encirclement and suppression war brought about a continuous increase in the number of wireless communication personnel and radio stations. In September 1931, the Central Soviet Area established wireless communication with the temporary central government in Shanghai, and generally ensured smooth internal wireless communication. At the same time, the Central Soviet Area continuously overcame difficulties and created conditions, establishing wireless communication with other Soviet areas and the main Red Army to accelerate information communication between them. With the temporary central government moving from Shanghai to the Central Soviet Area, in January 1933, Comrade Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to the Central Bureau and forwarded it to the central government regarding the analysis of the war situation at that time and subsequent action suggestions. He pointed out that "the development of the Red Army in the national Soviet Area requires more cooperation, and more absolute concentration and unified command." He suggested that the central government quickly select capable cadres to work in each Soviet Area; "For the sake of unity and centralized command, the Central Committee and the Central Bureau are requested to provide principled and policy instructions to the Red Army throughout the country, so that they can directly command the Red Army in various regions through telecommunications in the front." (Selected Military Works of Zhou Enlai (Volume 1), People's Publishing House, 1997 edition, pages 233-234). In order to crush the Nationalist Party's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, it was necessary to strengthen the unified leadership and command of the Red Army throughout the country, promote close cooperation among various Soviet areas, and the most convenient and safe way at that time could only be through radio. Therefore, by helping to establish wireless radio stations in various regions, we can carry out strategic cooperation actions to implement the central unified intention among various Soviet areas and the Red Army throughout the country. Through efforts, by early 1934, the Central Soviet Area had established wireless connections with major Soviet areas and the Red Army throughout the country, greatly strengthening its leadership over revolutionary work in various regions. Due to the long distance and inconvenient transportation, the Central Military Commission can only provide indirect command through wireless radio for the leadership and command of the Fourth Front Army, Second, Sixth, and Tenth Corps of the Red Army. For a certain campaign or battle, only principled instructions are given, not direct command. For the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Armies of the First Front Army of the Red Army